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Summary findings
Using  standard statistical  growth analysis,  Ahmed shows  external adjustment fully  on the real exchange rate, as
that Pakisran's  growth is the result of:  Pakistan  tried to do in the past, is inconsistent  with
- Rapid capital accumulation. Pakistan's  investment  improvements  in external balance. Real exchange  rate
rate was relatively  low but its fixed investment  rate grew  depreciation imposes  capital losses on the srack of
steadily in the 1970s, stabilizing  at about 17 percent of  external debt. The real exchange  rate should be set at an
GDP in the mid-1980s.  apprqpriate level, and monetary  and fiscal  policies
* Growth of the labor force, which offset a tendency  shoufd bc used to adjust demand.
toward capital intensity of production.  A substantial  adjustment effort will be needed to
* More competition from external trade.  increase  domestic savings  and investment rates. National
* A policy of economic liberalization  since 1978.  savings  should increase from 14 percent of GDP to 20-
Pakistan was able to sustain high growth and avoid a  22 percent of GDP. Raising  public revenues and reducing
financial  crisis  - despite large deficits  - because  real  public consumption  will achieve  public  savings  of 3-4
inLeresr  rates on debts were substantially  negative in the  percent of GDP (savings  are negative now). Public
1970s, so debc-to-GDP  ratios continued to decline. But  investmenr  should focus  on areas (such  as physical
real interest rates turned positive in the 1980s. If  infrastructure and human development)  that promote
Pakistan continues to have fiscal  deficits of the same  private investment,  economic growth, and equity.
mnagnitude  as in the past, a financial  crisis will quickly  To contain the fiscal  cost of domestic borrowing,
emerge. Pakistan cannot avoid a debt crisis by creating  Pak-istan  has pursued a policy  of financial  repression,
money. Higher inflation wiil hurt resource allocation and  which has repressed  the private credit and investment
income distribution.  needed for long-term growth. Also needed is more rapid
To guard againsr  reduced growth, weakened export  progress in human capital development,  especially
performance, and higher real interest rates, Pakistan  investnents in womcn's health and education.  To
shou)'l reduce its fiscal  deficit to below 4.5-5  percent of  compete intemationally  in manufacturing requires more
GDP and phase out quasi-fiscal  deficits.  skilled production and a better-cducated workforce than
Pakistan needs more balanced  use of fiscal,  monetary,  Pakismn  has had.
and exchange  rate policies. Putting the burden of
This paper  - a product of the Office  of the Director, South  Asia  Country Department  Ill - is parr of a larger  effort in the
department  to analyze  the nature  and extent  of the adjustment  challenges  faced  by Pakistan  in the 1990s.  Copies  of the paper  are
available  free from the World  Bank-,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Ann Bhalla,  room D10-071,
extnsion  84440 (47 pages). August 1994.
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Pakistan's  6.0% p.a. growth  rate over the  past two  decades  has been  considered  by some  as
a "development  puzzle" because this growth performance  has been accompanied  by three major
disconcerting  factors-high fiscal  and current  account  deficits,  relatively  low savings  and investment
rates, and poor human  capital  formation. What  factors  explain  Pakistan's  rapid growth? And, can
Pakistan  sustain  this high rate of growth  in the future  without  first addressing  the three disconcerting
factors  noted above?
Using a  standard statistical growdt analysis, the paper shows that, consistent  with the
predictions  of economic  theory,  the main  determinants  of growdt  have  been: a rapid pace of physical
capital accumulation,  the positive contribution  of labor force growth, greater competition  from
external  trade, and a policy  of economic  liberalization  since 1978. Although  Pakistan's  invrestment
rate remains  low by international  standards,  the fLxed  investment  rate grew steadily  during  the 1970s
and then stabilized  at around 17%  of GDP  p.a. since  the mid-1980s. This allowed  the capital  stock,
economy-wide  and in the manufactring sector, to expand  fairly rapidly  which in tmrn  supported  a
substantial  increase  in the capital  labor ratios and average  labor productivity. Although  a rapidly
growing population  with low skills coupled with a tendency  towards greater capital intensity  of
production  weakened  the contnbution  of labor in explaining  growth  especially  in the manufactrng
sector, the expansion  of labor force remained  a significant  determinant  of overall output growth.
The growth impact  of these traditional  factors was augmented  by improvements  in total factor
productivity  resulting from greater trade and other economic  hiberalizaton  that has happened in
Pakistan  since 1978.
The sustainability  of this high growth  performance  over the medim-to-longer term in the
fature is, however, doubtfil.  In the past, the main reason why Pakistan  was able to sustain  high
growth and avoid a fmiaucial  crisis in the face of large fiscal and balance of payments  defLeits  Was
ta  the real inrest  rates on both external  and  domestic  debts  were substantially  negative  during  the
1970s. As a result, debt  to GDP ratios continued  to decline  despite  large fiscal and current account
deficits. However,  real interest  rates tued  positive  during  the 1980s. So, even  though  on average
fiscal and current  account  deficits  were lower  in the 1980s,  the interest  burden of the domestic  and
external debts have increased significandy.  The oudook for the  1990s is that both  foreign and
domestic real intest  rates will remain significanly positive.  In this situation, if Paldstan were to
continue to  run fiscal deficits of the same magnitude as in  the past,  a financial crisis  is likely to
emerge pretty rapidly.
It is not possible to avoid a  "debt crisis" by funding large fiscal deficits through money
creation.  The analysis of this paper shows that Padistan's inflation target of 5% p.a.  is consistent
with "inflation  tax revenue"  in the 2-2.5  % of GDP range. The revenue  would  reach a maximum  of
3-3.2% of GDP with an inflation  rate of 20% p.a.  A further  -acceleration  of inflation  will cut the
"inflatior,  tax base" (real money  balances)  pretty rapidly  so that the revenue  proceeds from inflation
will actually  fall.  Even trying to generate  the maxinmm  revenue of 3-3.2% of GDP from higher
inflation  tax (20%) is  unwise. The adverse  effects  of this higher  inflation  on resource  allocation  and
income  distribution  can be quite severe.
Using a macroeconomic  consistency  framework,  the paper derives  estimates  of sustainable
current account  deficits (i.e. deficits that do not worsen external  creditworthiness)  in the range of3% of  GDP p.a.  Consistent with this and the Government's inflation target of 5% p.a.,  the
sustainable  fiscal deficits are in the range of 4.5-5% of GDP p.a.  (Note that the definition  of fiscal
deficit corresponds  to overall public sector borrowing requirement  and not the central government
budget deficits).  It is important  to note that the fiscal deficits in the 4.5-5% of GDP range are
sustainable  in the sense that such deficits are consistent  with other macroeconomic  targets/variables
(GDP growth, export growth, real interest  rate and inflation). If these  targets/variables  change, the
level of sustainable  fiscal deficit will also change.  In particular, external shocks could reduce
growth, weaken export perfonnance and raise real interest rates.  To guard against these risks, a
prudent policy stance  would be to aim for an even lower fiscal deficit than 4.5-5.0% of GDP.  The
paper also emphasizes  the need to phase out "quasi-fiscal  deficits", resulting from State Bank of
Pakistan's transactions  with the private sector, in order to ensure that revenes  from seignorage  are
actually available  to fmance the ordinary fiscal deficits and avoid additional  domestic  borrowing.
The paper suggests the need for a more balanced use of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate
policies. Patting the burden of external  adjustment  filly on the real exchange  rate, as Paldstan has
attempted since the mid-1980s, is inconsistent  with improvements  in external and internal balance.
This is not only because fiscal deficits  continme  to put pressure on internal  and external deficits but
also because  a real exchange  rate depreciation  imposes  capital losses on the stock of external  debt
A balanced policy stance involves setting the real exchange rate at its appropriate level and using
monetary and fiscal policies  to adjust aggregate  demand.
Given the need to  reduce macroeconomic  imbalances, the paper also concludes that a
substantial adjustment  effort will be needed to raise domestic saving and investment in order to
ensure the consistency  of these  macroeconomic  targets  with the growth target. The need, particularly
is to raise the national  saving rate from 14% of GDP presently to 20-22  % of GDP.  This, in turn,
wil  require a substantial fiscal adjustment which will raise public revenues and reduce public
consumption  to achieve  a public saving rate of 3-4% of GDP, as compared with negative savings
presently.  A similar adjustment  in public capital  spending will be necessary  to ensure that public
investment  is focussed  on areas that promote private investment,  economic  growth and equity-e.g.
physical infrasnucture and human  development.
Lower fiscal deficits will also  help reconcile the  need for  greater financial resource
mobilization  with the objective of stimulatng private investment.  A large part of the domestic
financing of the fiscal deficits has come from borrowing from the private sector.  To contain the
fiscal cost of domestic  borrowings,  Pakistan  has followed  a policy  of financial  repression for a fairly
long period.  The opportunity  cost of this policy has been reduced financial  resource mobilizaton
and repressed private credit and investment  As Pakistan proceeds with  financial  liberalization  to
facilitate  stronger  fmancial  intermediation  and inproved fimancial  resource a:location,  the reduction
of fiscal deficits will help contain the increase  in real interest rates and minimize the disincentive
effects of higher real interest rates for private investment.
Fmnally,  the paper argues that Paldstan's ability to sustain high growth rates over the longer
terms will also depend upon rapid progress with huiman  capital development. In the first place,
human  resource development,  particularly  investment  in female  education  and health, is essential  to
reduce the high populatLon  growth rate.  Secondly, the sources of future growth, in terms of types
of econonic activity,  will need  to change  substanfally, as compared  with the past, which will require- iii -
substantially  stronger human  capital input.  In particular, the reliance on a diversified  and dynamic
manufactring  sector, which can compete effectively  in the international  markets, wili have to
increase. This, in turn, will require a much  higher  skill-intensity  of production  and a generaly better
educated  labor force than in the past. The international  evidence  on the importance  of human  capital
formation for sustained  growth performance  is indisputable. Pakistan's recent shift in emphasis  on
this subject, as reflected  in the Social  Action  Program, is evidence  that this reality has dawned  upon
the policy makers.  Speedy and effective implementation  of this program, however, remains a
challenge.I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  At 6% p.a.,  Pakistan's growth performance  over the past two decades has been very
impressive  as compared  with most of the developing  world, except  the high performing  economies
of the East Asia Region. Although  less impressive,  this cc.npares  favorably  in per capita  terms as
well, even after allowing for Pakistan's very rapid population  expansion.  Pakistan's growth
performance  has been considered as a "development  puzzle" by some in view of a  munber  of
disconcerting  factors  that has prevailed  along with rapid growth.  These include:  first, despite  the
high growth rate, Pakistan's social indicators remain strikingly  poor -- Pakistan is among the
countries  with the highest  adult illiteracy  rate and lowest  primary school  enrollment  ratio; second,
while  Pakistan  has been able to avoid  high inflation,  its fiscal  and balance  of payments  deficits  have
been pretty large, contnbuting  to a fairly rapid increase  in its domestic  and external  debt burden;
third, notwithstanding  progress  in mobilizing  domestic  saving  and raising  the rate of investment,  the
saving and investment efforts remain at a  relatively low level as  compared with most uoher
developing  countries  of the world; the domestic  saving  rate, in particular. is strikingly  low, falling
below  the average  saving rate for the Africa Region.
2.  What factors  explain Pakistan's  rapid growth? And can Pakistan sustain this high growth
performance in  the next 10-20 years without first addressing the three disconcerting  factors
mentioned  above? The objective  of this paper is to try to provide some light on these two very
mportant  questions. The  paper is organized  as follows:  Section  II reviews  Paldstan's  development
performance  over the past two decades  in terms of a number  of key indicators  and compares  this
performance  with  other  developing  countries. Section  HI  analyzes  statistically  the factors  that  explain
Pakistan's past growth performance  using a commonly  used growth-related  analytical  framewort
Section  IV focuses  on the question  of sustainability  of the past growth  performance. Considerable
atenon  is given to this question  as Pakistan's  rapid growth  has generated  some  controversy  about
the importance  of paying  attention  to the prevailing  macroeconomic  imbalances. Finally,  Section  V
provides  summary  and conclusions. A list of cited work is included  and selected  background  data
are presented  in the Annex.
I.  PAKISTAN'S  DEVELOPMENT  PERFOORMANCE  OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES
- AN 1NTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON
Economic  Growth
3.  The trend  ia the expansion  of total and  per capita  GDP in Paistan over the past two  decades
-is  illustrated  in Graph  1. Although  the growth  path exhibits  considerable  variation-partly  reflecting
the  flucmatons of  agricultural  production but  also showing the  *ffects  of  frequent political
disturbances-the  trend growth  for total GDP is estimated  at 6.0% per annm,  which  is a stikingly
healthy performance  by international  standards (see Table 1).  A large part of this high output
growth, however, is spent simply  on sustaining  a very high pace of population  expansion  (3.1%
p.a.).  Even so, at around 3% p.a., Pakistan's  per capita  income  growth compares  favorably  with
most other developmg  countries  of the world (see Table  2).-2  -
Graph I
Pakistan --  Growth of GDP and Per
Capita GDP
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Social  Development
4.  The significant  grow  in per capita income coupled  with iflows  of remittances  enabled  a
modest growth in per capita conmption  (see Table 3).  This in turn allowed a reduction in the
xmmber  of people  living in absolute  poverty as measured  in income  terms (see Maik (1994)1.
5.  High growth, however, did not translate into sharp improvements  in the quality of life.
There is also a concern that the income distribution  may have worsened.'  Thus, along with high
growth, an equally  striking result is the rather dismal  performance  in terms of social indicators.
There i  substnial  debace  on thc quesfion of the incince  of porerty and its regional distnuton.  Furdter work is
undergoing in the Bank tO try to resolve some of the debate arising from data and methodology.  Few, however, doubt
the conclusion tat  absolute poverty measued  in income terms has been declining in Pakistan.
2  See Economic  Survey. 1992-93. Minis"ry  of Fnance (1993).-3-
T'able  1.  Growth in Pakistan's GDP - An Intemational  CompariRon
1970-80  1980-91
Pakistan  4.9  6.1
India  3.4  5.4
Bangladesh  2.3  4.3
Nepal  a/  2.1  4.7
Sri  Lanka  4.1  4.0
South Asia  3.5  5.4
East  Asia  and Pacific  6.6  7.7
Latin America  and the Caribbean  5.5  1.7
Middle East  and Norh  Africa  5.2  2. L
Sub-Saharan  Africa  4.0  2.1
World  3.5  3.0
a/  Estimated from World Tables 1993.
Source:  WDR,  1993.
Table 2.  Growth in Pakistan's GDP Per CaDia - An International  Comparison
1970-80  1980-91
Pakistan  1.8  3.0
India  1.1  3.3
Bangladesh  -0.4  2.1
Nepal  l  -0.2  2.2
Sri  Lanka_  2.4  2.6
South Asia  1.1  3.2
East Asia  and Pacific  4.8  6.1
Latin America  and the Caribbean  2.2  -0.3
Middle East and North  Africa  1.7  -1.1
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.9  -1.0
World  1.6  1.3
a/  Estimated  friom World Tables  1993.
Source:  WDR.  1993.-4  -
Table 3.  Growth in Pakistan's Per CaDim  ConsuTmtion  - An International Comparison
1970-80  1980-91  m
Pakistan  __1.1  1.6
Idia  0.6  3.2
Bangladesh  _0_4  ._.1.4  .
Nepal at  3.2  2.2
Sri Lanka
South  Asia  0.6  2.9
East  Asia and  Pacific  3.9  4.9
Latin America and the Caribbean  3.1  -0.6
Middle East and North Africa  - _ 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3  -2.4
World  1.6  1.3
a/  Estimated from World Tables 1993.
Source: WDRP 1993.
Although some progress was made in  raising life expectancy, reducing infant mortality, and
increasing adult  literacy, Pakistan's performance stll  compares poorly widt other  developing
countries (see Table 4).  For example, the infant mortality rate remains above the average for all
other regions of the developing  world except Africa.  Pakistan's adult illiteracy  rate is amongst the
highest in the world, exceeding  the average in all other regions.  Perhaps the most disappointing
situation is  regarding schooling achievement.  Pakistan's primary  school enrollment ratio  is
substantially  below the average for any other region in the world.  Moreover, there is substantal
discrimination  against female  education.
Macro-balances
6.  Pakistn faced significant  inflationary  pressures in thie  1970s,  but succeeded  in reducing  these
pressures in the 1980s. Indeed, its average  inflation  rate during the 1980's was amongst the lowest
in the developing countries, only bettered by the East Asia and Pacific Region (see Table 5).
Pakistan, however, ran substantial  fiscal deficits while the current account balance of payments
deficits have also been sizeable.  As explained later, while initially these deficits did not pose a
financial problem because of negative international  and domestic real interest rates, more recently
in the 1980 the effects of these fiscal and current account  balance of payments deficits have shown
up in terms of a growing debt burden.  External debt as a share of GDP, for example, grew from
37% in  1981 to 50% in  1992.  Domestic debt (excluding transactions with the Central Bank)
expanded  from 13% in 1981 to 31% in 1992.-5-
Table 4.  Paistan's  Social Indicators  - An International  Comparison
Life expectancy  Infant  Adult  Primary  Secondary
at birth  mortaliy  Illiteracy  enrollment  enrollnent
-1970  1991  1970  1991 1975 1991  1970  1990  1970  1990
Pakistan  46  59  142  97  79  65  40  37 at  13  22
India  47  60  137  90  .64  52  73  97  26  44
Bangladsh  45  51  140  103  78  65  54  73  - 17
Nepal  41  53  157  101  Bi  74  26  86  10  30
Sri Lanka  64  71  53  18  17  12  99  107  47  74
South Asia  49  59  138  92  - 54  67  88  25  39
East Asia and  Pacific  59  68  76  42  - 24  88  127  24  49
Latin America and the  61  68  82  44  - .16  95  107  28  49
Caribbean
Middle East and North  53  64  135  60  - 45  68  97  24  36
Africa
Sub-Saharan Afiica  43  51  144  104  - 50  46  68  6  17
World  |  58  |  66  |  8S  5  S3  - 35  83  104  15  39
_  =  Not  available.
a/  There is some controversy surrounding ihis number.  Other esdmates  suggest an improvement in the primary enrolhnent
ratio over 1970.
Source: 1) WDR 1993, 1979
2) World Tables,  1997
SavinEs  and Investments
7.  - A rapidly expanding  economy  is usually  assciated with a high rate of saving  and investment.
In the case of Pakistan, both saving and investment  rates have increased  noticeably. For example,
the domestic  saving rate grew from an average  of 7.3% in 1973-76  to 11.5% in 1988-91,  while the
toal  investment rae  expanded from  14.9% to  18.6% over  the  same period (see Table 6).
Nevertheless,  a stiking  result is that both the saving and investment  rates are below the average
found in other developing  regions except Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The saving rate is also below that
found in Sub-Sabaran  Africa.-6-
Table 5.  Pakistan's Macroeconomic  Balances  - An International  Comparison
Inflation rare at  Govt.'s budget deficit  Current Account  Exterial  Debt  Extenal  Debt
bl  Dercit bi ct  to Exponrs  d  to GNP di
1971-H0  1981-91  1971-80  1981-91  1971-80  1981-91  1980  1991  1980  1991
Pakistan  13.4  7.0  7.9  el  7.0  5.5  4.0  208.8  244.9  42.4  50.1
India  8.4  8.2  4.8 ft  7.7 g/  0.5  2.3  136.2  295.3  11.9  29.3
Nepal  8.5  9.1  2.5  7.2  2.7  8.0  85.5  370.0  10.4  53.5
Bangladesh  20.8  9.3  -0.2  ft  0.4  hl  7.8  7.5  345.3  443.7  31.3  56.0
Sri Lanka  12.3  11.2  10.4  9.5  5.4  9.2  123.4  211.0  46.1  72.6
Indonesia  21.5  8.5  2.6  1.2  1.3  3.3  94.2  223.2  28.0  66.4
Malaysia  7.3  1.7  6.0  6.4 It  0.6  4.0  144.6  53.7  28.0  47.6
lhailand  9.2  3.7  3.4  -0.2  4.2  4.9  96.8  94.9  26.0  39.0
Mexico  18.1  66.5  3.2  8.7  gl  5.7  1.3  259.2  224.1  30.5  36.9
Ienva  10.1  9.2  4.7  4.7  94  8.4  167.3  318.4  49.0  89.6
Ghana  352  40.0  6.5  3.7  1.8  5.9  116.0  384.5  31.8  66.9
Nigeria  15.2  18.1  5.3  6.4  -0.9  3.8  32.2  257.1  10.1  108.8
Sub-Sabaun  13.9  1A  - - - - 96.6  329.4  28.6  107.9
Africa,
Somud  Asia  9.7  8.3  _  _  _  _  160.4  287.1  17.0  35.6
East Asia &  9.1  6.3  _  _  89.8  96.2  16.9  28.2
Pacific
|MiddleEastand  18.8  8.6  _  _  _  _  114.4  185.8  31.0  58.8
North  Africa
Latin  America  43.1  208.2  _  _  _  - 195.5  256.0  35.1  41.3
and Caribbean
Severely  30.1  189.6  _  - 176.6  285.9  34.0  46.4
indebecd|
2a Period  average  (%  p.a.)
bi Period  avcrage  (%  of GDP) - Defined  narrowly  as  ihe  deficit of the Cenual  Government
el Current  account before official  transfers





Source: WDR 1993 and World Tables 1993, 1991-7-
Table  6.  Pakistan's  Saving  Investment  Trends  - An Intemational  Comparison
-T  1973-76  1980-83  1988-91
Total  Total  Total
Saving  Invest-  Saving  Invest-  Saving  Invest-
ment  ment  ment
Dom.  NaL  Dom.  Nat  Dom.  Nat.
Pakistan  7.3  6.1  14.9  8.3  9.9  18.8  11.5  13.8  18.6
India  19.6  20.0  19.9  20.6  21.8  23.6  22.1  22.0  24.3
Nepal  7.7  7.8  11.9  10.1  10.5  18.2  8.1  10.2  20.2
Bangladesh  0.0  0.0  8.2  2.0  1.6  14.9  2.6  2.0  11.7
Sri Lankcz  10.7  9.9  15.3  12.0  15.0  18.8  12.6  10.7  22.1
Indonesia  25.7  23.9  22.0  30.4  27.3  27.5  36.1  31.5  34.6
Malaysia  30.4  26.5  27.1  30.6  25.8  29.6  33.3  28.2  30.9
Thailand  23.4  23.7  25.9  20.1  19.1  34.3  29.5  28.2  34.3
Mexico  18.7  14.9  21.3  26.9  23.2  24.6  21.0  17.6  21.7
Kenya  19.4  14.3  22.5  19.0  16.8  24.9  18.8  15.6  23.5
Ghana  11.5  10.4  10.9  3.3  1.8  4.3  7.6  9.0  15.6
Nigeria  26.0  22.9  20.7  16.2  13.1  17.2  22.3  15.1  14.6
Sub-Saharan  Africa  20.2  - 19.8  14.2  _  17.9  13.1  - 16.2
South Asia  16.6  - 18.6  17.7  22-  25  19.3  - 22.8
East Asia & Piaific  27.6  - 27.7  29.2  - 29.7  38.4  - 37.5
LatinAmcrica&  22.0  - 23.2  22.1  _  21.9  22.7  - 20.3
Caribbean
Mikde East &  29.6  - 25.6  26.1  27.2  20.5  _  21.7
North  Africa
Source:  World  Tables 1993-8  -
II.  EXPLAINING PAKISTAN'S PAST GROWTH PERFORMANCE
Overview
8.  There is a large volume of literature, many of recent  origin, that seeks to explain the growth
performance  of countries  using statistical  models.  Much of the statistical investigation  is focussed
on explaining differences  in per capita growth across countries.  The analytical  foundation  of these
studies is usually centered around the debate whether growth can be explained  by the neo-classical
model that assumes diminishing  returns to capital so that economies  with low capital to labor ratio
will tend to grow fastcr and per capita income  across countries  would tend to equalize  over time, or
whether growth is 'endogenous' in the sense that there are constant or increasing  retmrns  to capital
allowing  rich economies  to continue  to grow faster than the poorer economies. (See, for example,
Rebelo (1991), Barro (1989; 1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); Romer (1986); Lucas
(1988)).Both  models, however, suggest that countries that are accumulating  capital and labor at a
faster pace will grow more rapidly.  And second, they both agree that the pace of accumulation  of
labor and capital  cannot  explain  all the differences  in output  growth.  The empirical investigation  has
largely focussed on explaining this residual growth that cannot be axounted  for by the rate of
expansion  of labor and capital.  The choice of other explanatory  variables has included  a measure
of  'human capital' and a  variety of  proxies to represent the influence of government policies
(measures of fiscal, monetary, trade, financial  and exchange  rate policies) and institutional  factors
including  political  climate (see, for example, Elias (1990); Barro and Lee (1993), Levine and Renelt
(1991); Maddison(1987)). Among the interesting  findings  are: first, a strong positive role of human
capital  in explaining  growth; and second, a significant  relationship  between trade policy  and growth-
Statistical  Analysis
9.  In the case of Paldstan, we used a simple relationship  that expressed the GDP growth rate
as a function of the rate of growth of physical capital, growth of labor, a measure of trade policy
and a dummy variable to capture the impact of economic  liberalization  since 1978.  The role of
human capital could not be investigated  due to the lack of an appropriate time series indicator of
human  capital. This relationship  was estimated  with aggregate  data over the period 1974-1992  using
overall GDP growth rate and the growth  rate in the manufacturing  sector alternatively  as a dependent
variable.  The best estimates are shown in Tables 7 and 8.  Data used for the regressions are
contained in the Annex Tables Al  and A2.
Table 7.  Determinants  of Pakistan's GDP Growth Rate. 19741992
Constant Tenn  Growth  of  Growth of  Measue of trade  Structural  change
l___________  Capital Stock  Labor  policy  dummy
C  GK  GL(-l) a1  (X+MIGDP)-1 at  D
Value of coefficient  -3513  2.50  0.49  0.43  8.00
t-stuistic  (-324)  (3.79)  (1.89)  (2.6D)  (3.35)
Adjusted  R; =  0.40  AR(1) p  =0.396(l.84)
a/  The best estimates  for labor and trade variable appeared with a one period lag.-9  -
Table 8.  Determinants  of Pakistan's Manufacturin, Growth Rate. 1974-1992
Constant Term  Growth of  Growth of  Measure of trade  Structural change
Capital Stock  Labor  policyr  Summary
C  GMK(-2) al  GML(-I) bl/  (X+M/GDP)-I  bh  D
Value of coefficient  -9.64  0.31  0.16  0.25  6.27
t-statistic  (-1.31)  a-36)  (1.41)  (1.23)  (3.82)
Adjusted R2=  0.65;  D.W.  =  1.89
31  The best estimates of capital appeared with a two-period lag.
bf  The best estirnates of labor and trade variable appeared with a one-period lag.
10.  The main results of the statisdcal  analysis are as follows:
Physical capital accumulation played a  very  important role  in  Pakistan's growth
performance-overall and in the manufacturing  sector-over the past two decades.
:Labor's contibution to overall growth showed up with the right sign and was also
statistically significant  at the 5% level.  However, in the case of manufacturing, the
coefficient  was 'significant  only at the 20% level.
Trade policy, as measured  by the ratio of total value of exports and import  to GDP,
came up with the right sign and a significaht  coefficient  (at the 5% level) in the case of
overall GDP; however, the variable was significant  at only the 25 % level in the case
of growth of maTnfacturing  output.
The  strctural  change  dummy,  included to  captare  the impact of  the change  in the
policy regime  m  Pakistan from the socialist-orientation of  the 1972-77 period  to the
market-oriented  economy  since 1978, came  up with a significant  coefficient  in both the-
equations.
Interoretation  of the Regression  Results
11.  The results of the regression analysis are intaitively appealig  and consistent with the
predictions,of  economic  analysis. Although  Pakistan's investment  rate remains low,  by ipternational
standards, the t&tal  and fiked invesunent  rates grew stadily  during the 1970s and then stabilized  at
around 19%  and 17% of GDP respectively  in the mid-1980s  (see Graph 2).  This allowed the capital
stock, economy-wide  and 'in the manufactring sector, to  expand fairly rapidly, which in turn
supported a substantial  increase in the capital  labor ratios and labor productivity  (see Table 9).
3  This measure of die openness of trade policy has been frequendy used in regression analysis, despite its limitations
because of the ease of consruction.  More sophisticated indicators, such as the one used by Leaner  (1988), are aLw
problematic.  See Harrison (1992) fbr a critical rview  of the literature on openness and growth.- 10-
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12.  The relatively weakter statistical significance of  the labor coefficient, especialy  in  the
maufrIng growth  equation,  partly  reflec= the growing  capital  intensity  of prodchltion.  But it
is also an indication  that, coloris paribuis,  population  growth is too fast in Paldstan.  Labor markets
cann  Ot  productively  absorb  such  a rapid  growth  in population,  particularly  with  Pakistan's  very low
skill leveles.  The increase  in capital  inte  nsity  could be the effect  of two forces at work-  First,
Palistan's  macrocemoomic policies  have generaly  favored greater  capital intensity  of produotn,
resulting from under-priced capual unports through over-vbalued  exchange  rate (well unt  the mid
1980s),  low interet rts  and other imentives. Seconxd,  extemal  migra:tion  of skilled  an  d  se  mi-
sldlled  labor in the 1970s  and early 1980s  tedd  to raise real wages (see Irfan and Ahmed (19B81).
13.  The positive impact of greater  openness to itraonltrade  and  external compeiition on
aggregate growth is a very important r-c;ult.  Again, this is intLiitively  appealing and consistent with
the findings  of other research  (see, for example, the East Asia Mirale  Study (1993)).  The lower
statistical  significance of the trade  variable in  the mauimwregresion  is ralher  difficult  to
explain as, a priori,  a large part of the effec  of greater efficiency resultmg from increased openness
should have come frnom  the  mariX  sector.- ii  -
Table 9.  Pakistan: Caital-Output  and Capital-Labor Ratios and Per Capim Output.  1972-92
(000'  Rs.,  1987 prices)
Overll  Economy  Manulacmnng
KIGDP  KIL  ODP/L  MKIMGDP  MKIML  MGDPIML
1972  - - - - - 12.4
1973  1.37  17.7  12.9  1.33  17.4  13.0
1974  1.42  18.4  13.0  1.33  17.7  13.4
1975  1.47  19.3  13.3  1.46  18.6  12.7
1976  1.53  20.3  13.4  1.70  20.9  12.3
1977  1.61  21.3  13.4  1.89  23.7  12.5
1978  1.61  22.0  13.8  2.01  26.5  13.1
1979  1.67  22.7  13.8  2.13  2B.8  13.5
1980  1.64  24.0  14.8  2.18  32.4  14.9
1981  1.62  25.0  15.3  2.34  35.1  IS.0
1982  1.62  26.0  15.8  2.19  37.3  17.0
1983  1.62  27.2  16.8  2.18  39.7  1B.2
1984  1.64  28.4  17.1  2.15  41.D  19.0
1985  1.63  29.6  18.2  2.10  41.7  19.9
1986  1.65.  31.6  19.2  2.07  45.7  22.0
1987  1.66  32.0  19.6  2.03  42.7  21.13
1988  1.63  33.7  20.6  1.94  40.3  25.4
1989  I.66  34.9  21.0  2.00  51.0  25.5
19900  1.70  36.0  21.2  1.97  53.0  27.1
1991  1.71  37.1  22.4  2.00  6.0  27.9
1992  1.70  38.7  23.5  - _  .
Source:  Annex  Tables  Al  and A2.
Table  10.  Contribution of Total Factor Productivity Change to Pakistan's  Economic Growth
(% p.a.)
Average  growth  of  Average  Growth  of  Average  Growth  of  Average  TFP
GDP  Capital  Labor  change
1973-1977  4.8  8.4  3.5  -1.2
1978-1992  6.4  6.8  2.6  1.6
Source:  Growth  of labor  capikal  and  output  are  estimated  from  Anne  Table  Al.  To  estmate  TBP  change,  the  she  of capital
was  assumed  at  0.52  and  die  share  of  labor  0.48.  These  are  based  on  dxe numbers  repored  in  Bumey  (1986);  an  average  of
the  1969-70-1979-80  period  is  used.- 12 -
14:  The strong  significance  of the structural  change  dummy  variable  is explained  by the major
improvement  in efficiency  resulting  from the change  in the policy regime from one of intervention
during the 1972-77  period toward  a more w.Arket-oriented  one in the following  years. The 1972-77
period was marked  by a heavily  interventionist  policy  framework  with a substantial  nationalization
of the economy  and,  numerous  controls  that distorted  incentives  and reduced efficiency. Many of
these  distortions  were reduced  gradually  in the subsequent  years. A simple  growth  accounting  shows
negative total factor productivity  (TFP) change during the 1973-77  period as compared  with the
positive  contribution  of TFP change  to growth in the later periods (see Table 10)4. Similar  results
are also reported  by Papanek  (1992)).
15.  The rather low  values  of adjusted  2 suggests  tht  a significant  part of the variation  in overal
and manufacturing  growth rates remain  unexplained  indicating  the possibility  of missing  variables.
It could also reflect the uneven  quality  of the data  used in the regression  analysis;  (see also Box 1).
One  obvious  missing  variable  is human  capital. There  is considerable  empirical  evidence  from cross-
country  analysis  that growth  and human  capital  are positively  and significandy  correlated. However,
measuring  the impact  of this in a time series analysis is not easy as a good proxy to capture the
quality aspects  of education  is not available  for Pakistan. The large variance  of the growth path,
however, also -implies  that a number of exogenous  factors including  changes in wealth, political
disturbances,  external  shocks  etc., could have played  important  roles in individual  years.  While it
is possible  in principle  to capture  these  effects  through  dummy  variables,  this is not done here  as the
policy implications  of these dummy  variables  is not obvious.
'B  -- '  OX  Pakista's  Bladkconomy--
Explaning  Pakista:  s growth;performance is:  comlicatedby'  the presence: of what  s
niere  any aTblick  ecoomy.  Teamcivties  that feed-into  t  hi
undrgr  ecnmyainclu  the  raandsmuggling:of  goods.-  There isnoir
data  on the size of this  economy,  although-estiiates  have been mi  the range exceeding
US40bllo=%r  vr9  of GDP.- Uneial,  a lagblack  cnycreats-:
difficulties  for measuing the true sizeof theluerlydng -econom-ic-  varables-  GD
savings, lavestinent,  exports  amL  imports. Therels  may-  wel be underestim  b  h
offiialdat.  I  paticlar  saing  an  inestmen_t  raesmihtbe  higher-m  taimlied  by
official  datHow  ldoes  thiscompic ate thgrowth  analysis?  T-  main*  imli  is  h
d~~~~~raiou  i  d;: so te  Of ftl-S-  domesticcaptlfoationcould  -besm  ;s  coefficient  oh--e cpi
variablewu---..
'  Therc  is little  evidec  of a higher  incidence  of external  shocks  or political  disturbances  in dhe  1972-1977  period  that
could  accoumt  for the  diffrnce in productivity.- 13 -
IV.  CAN PAST  HIGH GROWTH  RATES BE  SUSTAINED  IN THE
MEDIUM-TO-LONGER  TERM?
16.  The prevalence of the three disconcerting  factors mentioned  at the beginning of the paper  --
large fiscal deficits, relatively low saving and invesanent rates, and poor human development
indicators-has raised doubts whether past growth rates can be sustained  in the medium to longer-
term without substantially  reversing these adverse factors.  Let us examine the main concerns in
some greater detail.
Fiscal Deficits and Their Imulications  for Sustained  Growti
17.  The adverse implications  of large fiscal deficits for macroeconomic  balances  and, therefore,
for sustained  high rate of economic  growth are well known and there is a large body of empirical
research that supports these conclusions  (see, for example, Buiter and Patel (1992); Easterly and
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993); Fischer and Easterly (1990);  Sweder van Wijnbergen  (1989)). Put in simple
language, on the domestic side, large fiscal deficits tend to push up the inflation  rate, raise interest
rates, and discourage saving and private investment; on the external side, they tend to raise the
current account  deficit and external indebtedness. These developments  in turn constrain the growth
performance  over the longer turn.  Needless  to say, none of the results are automatic  and how fiscal
deficits transmit their effects through the economy  depends upon the specific  circumstances  of the
country concerned  and the behavior of other policy variables.
Fiscal Deficits and External Balances
18.  Pakistan has a long history of running large fiscal deficits.  Two obvious consequences  of
the deficits have been:
- a large increase in the ratio of domestic  debt to GDP since 1974 (see Graph 3); and
- a sharp increase in the interest cost of the budget (see Graph 4)
19.  A less obvious but important consequence  has been the contribution of these deficits to
external imbalances.  The relationship  between fiscal and current account deficits is indicated in
Graph 5, which suggests a strong positive correlation.  Statistical investigation  also supports the
conclusion  that fiscal deficits have a strong adverse consequence  for deficits in the current account
of the balance  of payments (results are reported in Table 11).
5  It is important  to note that in this paper fiscal deficit is defined  broadly to correspond to the  public sector bormwing
requirement.  The Government of Pakistan's definition  of 'budget deficit' is a subset of this broader definition.- 14 -
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Table 11.  Pakistan: Determinant  of Current Account Deficits 6. 1972-92
Terms of Trade  Real Exchange Rate  Fiscal Balance as a  Time Trend
share of GDP
l____________  (TOT)  (RER)  (FBGDP)  (T)
Coefficients  0.077  -0.651  0.767  0.403
T-Statistic  (3.59)  (-3.47)  (5.71)  (3.60)
Adjusted Rt  =  0.63  D.W.  - 2.25
20.  What has been the impact  on external  debt? The trend in external debt to GDP is shown
in Graph 6.  The graph reveals an interesting  pattern. The external debt  declined  as a share of GDP
well upto 1981,  but the trend has been sharply  reversed since then, rising from a low of around 37 %
of GDP in 1981  to over 53  % in 1991. What explains this pattern? The answer lies in the dynamics
of the debt (See Sweder van Wijnbergen  (1989)). It can be shown that:
o  The equation estimated took the form:
CABDGP =  f(F BGDP, RER. TOT. FRIR. GWI. T)
where:  CABGDP =  current account balance as a percentage of GDP
FBGDP  =  fiscal balance as a share of GDP
TOT  = External tenns of trade
RER  =  real exchange rate
FRIR  - foreign real intest  rate
GWI  =  growth of industrial countries GDP
T  time trend
This specification follows Khan and Knight (1983).  A priori, we expect TOT, FBGDP, and GWI to be positively
related to the current account balance. while RER and FRIR should be negatively related to CURBAL.  The full regression,
including  GWI and SUiR yielded the foDowing  results:
CURBAL =  0.062 TOT +  0.722 FBGDP + 0.21 GW[ - 0.619 RER - 0.0164 FRM  +  0.389 T
(2.27)  (4.88)  (0.95)  (-2.54)  (-0.31)  (2.56)
Adjusted R2=0.53. D.W.=2.11
All coefficients  have the right signs but GWI and FRIR failed to show a significant relationship (as indicated by the t-
statistic in parenthesis).  So, the equation was reestiunated  widtout  GWI and FRIR and the results are reported in the Table
11 above.-18  -
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Ad=  (r-g)  d-v4  ALd  (1) e
where d  =  debt-output  ratio
A  =  change in the debt-output  ratio
r  =  real interest rate on extrnal  debt
v  =  non-interest  current account  balance  as a percentage of GDP.
e  real exchange rate
Ae  =  rate of change of real exchange  rate
e
g  =  real rate of economic  growth-1 9-
Equation  (1) states that the change in the external  debt to GDP ratio can be traced to three factors:
(i) the growth in the ratio due to the excess  of the foreign  real interest  rate over the real growth of
GDP ((r-g)d); (ii) te  non-interest  current account  balance  (v); and (iii) the capital loss on external
debt due to real exchange rate depreciation ( A@) . The contribution  of the three factors to the
change  in the external  debt-GDP  ratio is shown in Table 12. The main results are as follow:
Table 12. Pakistan:  Determinants  of External Debt-GDP  Ratio. 1973-1991
(%6)
Ad  (r-g)  d  Aed
1973-19  1  -28.4  -64.8  .40.3  -39
1981-1991  16.1  -26.8  -19.3  23.6
Source: Own estimates.
Between  1973  and 1981, Palistan experienced  substantial  non-interest  current account
deficits. By itself,  this should  have contributed  sipificantly to raising  the external  debt-
GDP ratio.  However, the ratio declined  noticeably  because  the adverse implication  of
these deficits was more than offset by the contributions  of a large negative external
interest  rate and the high GDP growth  rate 7. The appreciation  of the real exchangc  rate
(see Graph 7) also contributed  to reducing  the external debt-GDP ratio by causing a
capitl  gain on the stock of real debt, although  it tended  to raise the ratio on the flow
side by worsening  the current balance.
In sharp contrast to the earlier period, between 1981  and 1991, the external  debt-GDP
ratio increased  noticeably,  even  though  the level of non-interest  current balance  was on
average less negative than during 1973-81 and the average' growth of  GDP was
somewhat  higher than  in the previous  period. The external  debt to GDP ratio increased
partly because  the foreign  real interest  rate turned positive  and, as a result, the cushion
provided  by the large  negative  "dynamic  debt  component"-(r-g)d-was weakened  in this
penod.  Furthermore,  while  the depreciation  of the real exchange  rate helped  reduce  the
non-interest  current deficits, it also had a substantial  offsetting rising impact on the
external debt-GDP  ratio through  its direct effect  on capital  losses on the stock of debt.
T  The interest  rate  is defined  as the average  inteu  rate  and is derived  as the rado of interest  payments  to total  exteral
debt. The main  reason  why  average  nominal  inerest rates  were so low  in  this period  is because  of the dominance  of official
concessional  loans  in the external  debt  portfolio.Graph  7
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21.  These  results, especially  the role of international  real interest  rate, is very importnt and has
strong mplications  for the sustinable level  of current account  deficit  for the future.  For example,
if real interest  rates in the 1973-81  period were even  barely  positive  (close to zero) the exrnal  debt-
GDP ratio would have risen by 6 percentage  points ever the period instd  of declining  by 28
percentage  points.  Given the current outlook for intenational real interest rates (2-3% in real
tams),  runing  non-interest  curent deficits  as in the past would  quickly  put considerable  pressure
on the external  debt-GIP ratio.  If real intest  rates were to exceed  the growth of real GDP for a
significant  period, the  county  would  mov.e  towards  external insolvency.
22.  The role of real exchange rate changes in the external debt-GIP ratio also merits special
attention. The substantial  adverse direct  effect of the real exchange  rate depreciation  on extemal
debt-GDP ratio over the  1981-91  period should not be  i  ted  as  a  case against real
depreciation.  The real depreciation  was necessitated  by the need to improve  export competitiveness.
As noted  from  the results of Table 11, the RER has a positive  impact  ofrtlie  current accounflblance,
working through  both exports and imports.  Therefore, the posiive efficts of the real exchange
depreciation  on exports and economic  growth  needs  to be taken ito  account  along with the capital
loss on the stock  of debt. However, the important  message  here is the need  to avoid shifting  the full
burden of extnal  adjustment  on the real exchange  rate, which is what Pakistan  appears  to have been
doing over the.past decade, and balance  the exchange  rate management  wit  fiscal adjustment- 21 -
Fiscal Deficits and Internal Balance
23.  Pakistan's  relatively  low rate of inflation  despite  high rates of fiscal deficits  has led some to
believe that prevailing  fiscal deficits, although  higher than desirable, are still manageable. Let us
examine  this argument in some greater detail. We first turn to the dynamics  of fiscal deficit, total
government debt and money creation, which can conveniently  be summarized  by the following
expression  (see Easterly  and Fischer (1990)).
Atd=-z-u+(r-g)  td  (2)
where Atd  =  change in total (domestic  plus external) government  debt as a share of
GDP
r  =  real interest rate on total government  debt
g  =  real growth rate of GDP
z  =  primary budget  balance  as a percentage  of GDP
a  =  seignorage  revenue  as a share of GDP
24.  The intaition  behind  this expression  can be seen  as follows. The change  in total government
debt as a percentage of GDP can be explained  by three factors.'  First, other dtings remaining
unchanged, the non-interest  fiscal deficit (primary deficit) will increase the debt to GDP ratio.
Second, the non-interest  fiscal deficit can be fianced through money creation-this is the role of
seignorage  as a share of GDP.  Third, to the extent  that money  creation falls short of the primary
deficit, this gap will need to be financed through new debt which in turn will generate interest
obligations. However, the denominator  of the debt ratio is GDP, so the debt ratio will decline  with
real growth. So far as real growth of the economy  is less than the real interest rate on public debt,
the contribution  of this third factor to the debt-GDP  ratio will be negative.
25.  The third component-(r-g)td-shows  the dynamics  of the debt through the interplay  of real
interest  rate and real economic  growth. Suppose  the government  were runnng primary deficits that
exceed  the amount  of resources mobilized  through  the seignorage. Then, the government  will need
to borrow (domestically  and/or externally). Now if the real interest rate on this borrowing exceeds
the real growth  of the economy, then the numerator  of the debt to GDP ratio wilU  grow faster dtan
the denominator, causing the debt to  GDP ratio to  grow without limit.  At some point, the
government  will find in impossible  to borrow  any further as confidence  problems take over.
26.  What would  prevent the government  from financing its entire non-interest  deficit through
money  creation  and avoid the instability  of the debt dynamics  component? The answer lies in the
implications  of  money creation for  inflation and the  feedback of this high  inflation for the
t  Note that the impact of real exchange rate  changes on extrnal debt in ignored in this formTula.- 22 -
susmainability  of.growth.  The relationship between seignorage (or inflation tax)C  and the demand for
real balances can be shown as follows (see Box 2).
Box  2
Money and Inflation in the Long Run
In steady'state, the rate of inflation will equal.  the rate of growth of money less the real rate
of growth of the:economy.
r  =  m-g  -(i)
- .:  ~  M-
where: :rr  ---.  ; AP.IP  .-  ;the:rate%of  inflation..-%
.-  - =  -M--  -;therate.of  growth of monery
g- - g.-  AyIy  -;the rate of growthof  output
:e  inflatio xtat. is.  defined  .. as the real valueaof the:  base-  money
... ....... T  ,  . . .. ....  .....  .
-.-.  . .,  ..-- :..  :..-.........................  -:.-::..----  -.-
-=  ~  MIP  @  i.  a-
------.  tiiFcarrbe. earrangeu1ro  .yield.  ............. :-..:.-.----:-.  .
See'  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~  ...... 
.-. *.*-,.  -4VXX =l-'Z.--. ..  (a  e~  --..  .-..
g  _  9'~~~~~7_  '-+g  _'(3')  ' 
where T  =  AM/p the inflation  tax
T-  =  domestir-  rte  of inflation
g  =real  GDP growth  rate
M  =  base or "high-powered'  noney
P  =  domestic price level
MIP  =  real base money--
9  A disDncdot  is often  drawn  between  seigi2orage  and inflation  tax. We use  these  concepts  inter-changeably  in this
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Expression  (3) indicates  that the amount  of resources  that  could be mobilized  though money  creation
depends  on three factors  - the rate of inflation,  the growth  of the economy,  and people's willingness
to hold real money  balances. If the  demand  for real balances  were invariant  with respect  to inflation,
the government  could  in principle  mobilize  large  amounts  of resources  though  money  creation. The
problem, however, is that empirical  evidence  shows that the demand for real money  balances  is a
negative  function  of inflation  and this sensitivity  increases  with the pace  of inflation. So, other things
remaining  unchanged,  more money  creation  would cause a more rapid pace of inflation  which will
reduce the demand  for real money  balances. Therefore, the impact  of inflation  on seignorage  will
depend  upon the relative strengths  of the two opposing  forces--with  high inflation  the inflation  tax
rate (sr) goes up, but the tax base (MIP) falls.1 0
27.  Let us now apply these concepts  to Pakistan's  case. Table 13 shows the government's  total
debt, interest  payments, primary  deficit and seignorage,  all expressed  as a percentage  of GDP.  A
number of important  points  should  be noted. First, in calculating  domestic  debt, the Government's
obligations  to the State Bank  of Pakistan  (SBP)  are excluded  as these are simply  the counterpart  of
a large component  of the seignorage.  Second, it is assumed that the Government  does not pay
interest on the SBP's holding  of T-bills.  Examination  of the SBP profit and loss accounts  suggest
this is a  reasonable assumption.  Third, seignorage revenues are broken down by  the actual
beneficiaries. A significant  share of the seignorage  revenues  are returned  back to the private sector
through SBP rediscounts to commercial  bank at below market rates."  The profile of total debt
shows  the same  pattern as external  debt, declining  upto 1981  and then  a large increase  to over 84%
of GDP by 1991. Decomposing  the change in total debt-GDP  ratio into its determinants  yields the
following  results (see Table 14).
Pakistan ran large budget deficits between 1973 and 1981; other things rening
unchanged,  the associated  primary  deficits  would  alone  have added  77 percentage  points
to the total debt-GDP  ratio over the period.  The effect of these large deficits was,
however, more than offset by a combination  of revenues from seignorage, negative
interest rates, rapid  economic  growth  and an appreciation  of the real exchange  rate. So,
despite large fiscal deficits,  the total debt-GDP  ratio actually  declined.
During 1981-1991,  the total debt-GDP ratio changed gear and grew rapidly, expanding  by 38
percentage  points over the period. What caused  this worsening? First, of course, was the role of
fiscal  deficits-although  primary  deficits  were lower on average  than  during  the previous  decade, they
remained  significantly  large. In fact, other  things  remaining  unchanged,  pnmary deficits  alone  would
have  added 52 percentage  points  to the total  debt-GDP  ratio. A second  factor that added  to the debt-
D  This relationship  between inflation  and seignorage tkes  the form of a bell-shaped  curve.  Seignorage initially ises with
inflation, then reaches a  uaximum  before declining. The classic work is due to Cagan (1956). also modified by
Friedman (1971) to bring  in the role of income growdt in seignorage, and by Bailey (1962) to show the impact of
welfare  costs of inflation.  Friedman's modification  is especiaUy  important  for low inflationi  countries, where higher
economic growth by itself will yield non-inflationary  means of budget financing  through moderate money creation.
The correct definition  of seignorage revenues for the Treasury requires one further adjusrmenL Iterest earned by SBP
on the rediscounts  kss  interest paid by SBP on comnercial bank required reserves should be added back.
Unavailabiliy  of the required data  presented this adjusbuent.- 24 -
GDP ratio was the depreciation  of the real exchange  rate.  As noted earlier,  although  real exchange
rate contributed  to improving  external  creditworthiness  by increasing  exports, it nevertheless.  raised
the debt-GDP  ratio through  its impact  on capital  loss on the stock of external  debt. The less rapid
increase  in the total debt-GDP  ratio was partly due to the revenues from seignorage,  which Mnded
to offset almost a  tird  of the impact of the primary deficits.  Moreover, the debt dynamics
component  continued  to dampen the adverse effects of high deficits because of Pakistan's strong
growth performance,  even though interest  rates turned positive  in real terms.
Table 13:  Pakistan:  Trends in Debt. Interest  Payments, Primary Balance
and Seignorage  as percentage  of GDP
Year  TDGDP  GINTGDP  PBGDP  SENGDP  Treasury use of
SENGDP
1972  72.5  1.8  - 4.1  3.6  2.6
1973  79.3  1.7  - 6.5  2.2  0.3
1974  67.4  1.7  - 7.0  4.8  -2.3
1975  59.6  1.5  -11.4  2.0  0.7
1976  60.9  1.9  -11.0  2.3  1.6
1977  61.6  1.9  - 9-0  2.8  3.0
1978  595  1.9  - 8.1  2.2  2.1
1979  582  2.0  - 9.6  3.6  2.6
1980  55.2  2.2  - 8.2  2.4  0.7
1981  49.8  2.0  - 6.5  1.2'  -0.6
1982  55.4  2.2  - 6.5  2.3  2.3
1983  .59.7  2.9  -8.2  1.9  0.9
1984  57.6  3.4  - 6.5  2.2  2.2
1985  63.9  3.5  - 5.2  1.2  0.4
1986  76.0  3.8  - 4.3  2.8  1.7
1987  84.4  4.2  - 4.0  3.0  1.3
1988  76.0  4.9  - 3.6  1.6  1.0
1989  80.4  . 5.0  - 2.7  2.5  1.8
1990  83.9  5.5  - 1.0  2.5  2.0
1991  84.3  5.0  - 3.8  4.1  3.3
1992  80.6  5.3  - 2.2  1.4  0.7
Source:  Estimatedfromdataavailable inEconomicSurvey,  Ministry  of Fmance(various  issues);  International  FmancialStatstics
(IFS) of DIF and the Monthly Bulletin  of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).  See also Annex Table A3.- 25 -
Table 14: Pakistan Factors Underlvinz  the Changes  in the Total Debt-GDP  Ratio. 1973-1991
(%)
Year  Atd  z  ii  (r-g)zd  e
d
1973-1981  -29.5  -77.1  8.1  -94.6  -3.9
198 1-1991  34.5  -52.3  16.3  -25.1  23.6
Source:  Own estimates
Although  the debt dynamics  component  remained  favorable,  it is inportant to note the
substantial  difference  in the impact  over the two  periods. Indeed,  the differential  effects
of.  the debt dynamics  component  on the total debt-GDP  ratio over the past two decades
is.  a key result that needs  emphasis. The reason that Pakistan  has avoided'an  explosive
debt sitation  in the face of large fiscal deficits over the past twenty  years is largely
explained  by the fact that real interest  rates  have been negative  for a substntial period.
However,  the interest  rate on both external  and domestic  debt has been  turning  positive.
Continued  high growth of the economy  has helped absorb the adverse effect of this
change. But unlike  the 1970s,  this cushior is weakening. Indeed, if real interest  rates
had been positive-say 3  % in real terms over the past twenty  years-the total debt-to-
GDP ratio would  have  expanded  by an additional  40.5 percentage  points between  1973
and 1991, reaching 125% in 1991.
28.  Can Pakistan  run large fiscal deficits  as in the past and avoid a debt crisis by financing  these
deficits  through  seignorage  or inflation  tax? In order to estimate  the relationship  between  seignorage
and inflation, we first need to estimate the demand for real money balances.  The following
specification  was used to esfimate  the demand  function:
fl2  1 B)  =  Ln  A  +  a 0 ln y  - cis  +  £2  in  (-p)  -1
where  Ln  =  natural log
A  =  constant
BM  Base or high-powered  money
P  =  price level
y  = real income
X  =  inflaton rate
The specification  allows  the elasticity  of demand  for real balances  to vary along the demand curve.
The estimated  results are shown  in Table 15. The coefficients  are of the right sign.  The long-term
elasticity  of real balances  with respect to real income  is close to one.- 26 -
Table 15:  Pakistan: Demand  for Real Money Balances. 1973-1992
Variable  LnA  Lny  |r  Ln (Bp  )-
Coefficient value  -0.376  0.256  -0.011  0.757
t-mtio  C-Oil)  (1.70)  (-3.34)  (6.06)
D.W. =  2A1, Adjusted It  =  0.98
Using these results and expression  (3), the relationship  between  seignorage and inflation is shown
in Graph 8.  The graph suggests that in Pakistan  the demand  for real balances  is pretty sensitive  to
inflation. Seignorage  grows noticeably  with inflation  reaching  a maximum  of about 3.2% of GDP
at an inflation  rate of 20%, and then falls as higher inflation  cuts into the base of the inflation  tax
and reduces revenue despite the higher tax rate.  During the past two decades, Pakistan mobilized
some 2% of CGDP  p.a. on average  as inflation  tax, running  an average  inflation  rate at below 10%
p.a.  While  there is some scope  to mobilize  higher revenues  from inflation  tax, the price will need
to be an acceleration  of inflation  in the 15-20%  range with adverse  consequences  for other  economic
variables. But most importantly,  even if the Government  were to accelerate  inflation  to the 15-20%
range, on average it would mobilize only an additional 1.2% of GDP from seigcorage. So, with
positive  real interest  rates, the end result of the large fiscal deficits  will be a continuously  rising debt
to GDP ratio which cannot  be sustined in the long runt 2.
Sustinable Current Account  and Fiscal Deficits-Implications  for the 1990s
29.  We now  have all the elements  of the analytical  framework  to pull together  the various threads
and draw the mplications  for sustainable  current  account  and  fiscal deficits  for Pakistan  in the 1990s.
Let us first examine  what constitutes  sustainable  current account  deficits.
30.  Sustinable current account  deficits: Estinating sustairable  current account  deficits  involves
determining Paldstan's room for  additional external borrowing.  This  is  turn  involves two
considerations:  solvency  and creditworhiness. It can be shown that solvency  requires that
=  Note also dcat  the relationship  between  seignorage  and inflation  is not  a static  one.  Pakistan  seems to be an oudier  in
terms of its ability  to generate  higher  than  average revenue  from seignorage  than  other  countries  at comparable  inflation
raes.  For example,  Easterly  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993) show that  over nearly  20 years  across 51 countries,  three quarers
of anumal  observations  of inflation  tax revenues  were less than  2% of GDP. One important  reason  for the higher  seignorage
revenue  yield in Pakistan  is the high rate  of economic  growth. Another  reason  is the large  ratio  of base money, particularly
currency,  to GDP resulting  frin  the low financial  depdt of the Pakistni economy. So, with greater  financial  deepening,
the ability  to raise  seignorage  revenue  is likely to fal  even with  similar  GDP growth  rate  and inflation.- 27 -
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which states that the non-interest current surplus must at least equal the initial debt times the
difference  between  real interest  cost of foreign  debt and real outW growth rate.'3 So long as the
real interest  rate is lower than  the real growth  of the economy,  Pakistan  can continme  to run current
account  deficits  without  becoming  insolvent. The need  to maintain  solvency  of its external  payments
obligaton alone sets some strict limits  on Paldstan's future current account  deficits.  Thus, given
Paldstan's  growth  target  of 6  % p.a. and given  the oudook  for international  real interest rate of 2-3  %
per annu  in the next  5 years, Pakistan  can run non-interest  current deficits  of about 1.5-2%  of GDP
which implies  a current account  deficit of about 3-3.5  % of GDP p.a.  The higher the real interest
rate, the lower the non-interest  deficit that will maintain  solvency.  Indeed, if real interest rates
13  See Sweder van Wijnbergen  (1989).- 28 -
exceed the growth rate of the economy, the non-interest current balance would need to go into
surplus to maintain  solvency.
31.  Solvency  consideration  alone is often not enough to enable a country's continued  access to
external  finance. The lenders  perception  of a country's "creditworthiness"  is what counts. Lenders
look at various indicators, particularly the economy's capacity to service the debt.  In practice,
various measures  of this capacity  are used-including the debt-service  racio, the debt/exports ratio
and the debt/GDP  ratio. Commercial  lenders  pay particular attention  to the debt-service  and the debt
to export ratios, as they represent direct measures  of the economy's ability to service debt in the
short run. Over the longer term, appropriate  policy  changes  can allow a diversion  of resources from
most tradeables  to tradeables. So, the debt to GDP ratio is a better measure of a country's capacity
to service its debt  over the longer-term. As suggested  by Daniel  Cohen (1985, 1988),  an appropriate
measure  of a country's creditworthiness  is the 'debt-resource'  ratio, which  is calculated  as a weighted
average  of debt to  GDP and debt to exports ratios. Another  useful result from Cohen's work is that
if a country has not defaulted,  then maintning  a constant  debt to resource ratio constitutes  a better
debt strategy than forcing the country to  reduce this ratio.' 4 Using these results, Pakistan's
sustainable  current account  deficits are indicated  in Table 16.  The table suggests that higher the
GDP growth rate and/or the higher the export growth rate, the higher the level of sustainable  current
account  deficits. Thus, given Pakistan's  medium-term  target of achieving  6 percent growth in GDP
and the projected  real export growth of 6-7% p.a.  (the same level as over the past 20 years), the
maximum  levels of current account  deficit that are sustainable  (maintmins  a constant  debt to resource
ratio) is around 3 percent per annum.  If export growth can be accelerated  tfrther to say, 8% p.a.
and the GDP growth is boosted  to 7% p.a. the level of sustainable  current account deficit can be
raised by another half percentage point.
Table 16.  Pakistan: Prudent Levels  of Foreign Borrowing-Sustainable  Current Account Deficits
(% of GDP)
GDP Growdi Rate  _Growth  Rate of Exports 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8
2  1.0  1.3  13  1.8  2.0  2.3  2.6
3  1.2  1.5  1.7  2.0  2.2  2.5  2.8
4  1.4  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.4  2.7  3.0
5  1.6  1.9  2.1  2.4  2.6  2.9  3.2
6  1.8  2.1  2.3  2.6  2.8  3.1  3.4
7  2.0  2.3  2.5  2.8  3.0  3.3  3.6
ouc:Own  estinmats
4  A counry  that has been current in servicing its debt should not be required to reduce the debt-resource ratio because
the transition cost could resuk in lower creditworthiness. If. however, this reduction rakes place as a result of a surge
in exports, a strong GDP growth and strong domestic resource mobilization, that would be fine.  The issue here is to
avoid an extra degree of constraint.- 29 -
32.  Sustainable  fiscal  deficits. Sustainable  current  account  deficits  impose  significant  restrictions
on sustainable  fiscal  deficits. The intuition  underlying  this can best be seen from the fundamental
budgetary  constraint  that fiscal deficits  need  to be financed  through  external  borrowing,  domestic
borrowing  or money  creation. The level  of external  borrowing  is determined  by sustainable  current
account  deficit (as above); the level of domestic  borrowing  is determined  by the need to avoid a
domestic  debt explosion  and crowding  out of the private  sector: while the level of money  creation
depends  upon  the level of inflation. So, for any  given  growth. external  balance  and inflation  targets,
there  is a particular  level  of fiscal  deficit  that  is consistent  with  these  targets. Thus. given  Pakistan's
growth  target  of 6 percent  p.a. and the sustainable  level  of current  deficit  that is consistent  with this
target  (defined  in Table 16)'5,  the sustainable  levels of fiscal deficits is illustrated  in Table 17 as
a function  of the rate of inflation.' 6 For domestic  borrowing,  we assume  zero additional  domestic
borrowing. The rationale  for this assumption  is quite  simple. With  greater financial  liberalization
currently  underway  in Pakistan,  the  real interest  rate on government  domestic  borrowings  has been
turning  significantly  positive,  reaching  about  3  % in 1993. As fmancial  sector distortions  are further
reduced,  GOP is likely  to face the full market  cost of domestic  borrowing  which is expected  to be
around  5-6% in real terms. In this  situation,  it will  be imprudent  for Paldstan  to continue  to increase
its domestic  debt because,  as explained  in para 25, the debt dynamics  interplay-(r-g)dt-could  lead
towards  financial  insolvency' 7.
33.  The results of Table 17 are quite revealing. First, Given  Paldstan's growth  target of 6%
p.a.,  an inflation  target of 5% (by 1996),"8  and assuming  an export growdt rate of 7% p.a.,
consistency  of the  external  target  (creditworthiness)  requires  that  fiscal  deficits  are reduced  to around
4.5-5% of GDP p.a.  This is much  below  the 8% average  of the past decade  and the 9.7% reached
in 1992193. Second,  adding  another  half percentage  pomt to the fiscal deficit will require, in the
absence  of bigher  borrowing,  an acceleration  in the inflation  rate  to 15-20%  p.a.  This suggests  that
the inflationary  consequences  of higher  fiscal  deficits  are substantial. Third, financing  even  further
increases  in fiscal  deficits  will require  higher  external  or domestic  borrowing  because  running  higher
inflation  will be counter-  productive  for revenues. Given  the trend  towards increasing  real interest
rates, these higher borrowing  will result in a serious  debt problem; this in turn will jeopardize
Palistan's ability to maintain  growth  rates at 6% p.a.
I  We assumre  a growth rate of 6% p.az and export growth  of 7% p.a.,  which yields a sustainable  current account  deficit
of 3.1% of GDP.  Roughly  70% of this is available  for the public sector.
16  Note that this is a somewhat  simplistic  presentation  as it ignores  the general equilibrium  effects of inflation  on growth
and current account deficits. Also, the real exchange  rate is assumed to remain  constant.
17 It is possible  to argue that Pakistan  is moving  towards  a more open economy. including  greater international  capital
mobility. This means  Pakistan  could end up aligning  its financial  policies  with the international  market  so that domestic  and
international  interest rates are fully aligned.  Even in this extreme  case of perfect capital  mobility, real interest rates in
Pakistan  are likely  to be higher than in the international  markets  due to country  creditworthiness  risk considerations.
Depending  upon the risk premium,  a divergence  of one to two percentage  points between international  and Pakistan  interest
rates would still lead domestic  real interest rates in the 4-5% range. With real interest rates very close to real GDP growth
rate, and given the already large interest cost of domestic  debt, it would be prudent  to avoid any further increase  in
domestice  debL
'  As described  in the 1993194-1995/96  PFP.- 30 -
34.  It is important  to note  that fiscal  deficits  in the 4.5-5% of GDP range are sustainable  in the
sense that  such  deficits  are consistent  with  other  macroeconomic  targets/variables  (GDP growth  rate,
export growth  rate, inflation  rate, real interest  rate). If these targets/variables  change, the level of
sustainable  fiscal deficit will also change.  [n particular, external shocks  could reduce economic
growth, weaken  export performance  and  raise  real interest  rate. For example,  if a sustained  external
shock  were to reduce  medium-term  export  growth  to 4% p.a., and  GDP were to falter  to 3-4% p.a.,
sustainable  fiscal deficit will fall below 4% of GDP.  Similarly,  as noted in footnote 12, GOP's
ability to mobilize  2.6% of GDP in terms of seignorage  revenue at 5% inflation rate could be
reduced  with the greater  monetization  of the economy  and improvements  in financial  services. This
is very likely, as suggested  by the experience  of more financially  developed  economies  where the
ratio of base money  to GDP is much lower.  To guard against these risks and uncertainties,  a
prudent  policy  stance  would  be to aiqn  for an even lower  fiscal deficit  than 4.5-5  % of GDP.
35.  Seipnora2e  and Ouasi-Fiscal  Deficits: The arguments  underlying  the result of Table 17 is
based  on the key assumption  that  the full amount  of seignorage  revenues  are available  for financing
the fiscal deficit.  However, as noted, this has not been the case in the past.  A part of the
seignorage  revenue has been used to finance "quasi fiscal deficits" resulting  from transactions
between  the State  Bank  of Pakistan  and the private  sector. There are three sources of quasi  fiscal
deficits:  (1) subsidized  credit schemes  funded  by the SBP; (ii) exchange  -ate losses resulting  from
SBP  forward cover  operations;  and (iii) write-off  on loans  that  are not recovered. The cost of these
transactions  are estimated  at around 1.3  % of GDP  in 199019l. The diversion  of seignorage  revenues
to finance quasi fiscal deficits  has required additional  domestic  borrowing  to finance the ordinary
fiscal  deficits. Apart  from the resource  misallocation  implications  of the quasi-fiscal  deficits,  their
macroeconomic  implications  in terms of additional  domestic borrowing needed to fiance  the
ordinary  fiscal deficits suggests  an urgent need to review and rapidly  phase out these quasi-fiscal
tansactions. Without  this policy  change,  financing  of fiscal  deficits  even  in the  4.5-5 %  range would
require  positive  net domestic  borrowing  with adverse  financial  consequences.
Table 17. Pakistan: Sustainable  Fiscal Deficits  as a Function  of Inflation  Rate
(%  of GDP)
Inflation Rate  Seignorage  Net External  Net Domestic  Sustainable  Fsal
. ____________  _______________  Borrwing  Borrowing  Deficits
5  2.6  2.2  0  4.8
10  3.0  2.2  0  5.2
15  3-1  2.2  0  5.3
20  3.2  2.2  0  5.4
25  3.0  220  5.2
30  2.8  2.2  0  5.0
Source: Own esdma- 31 -
Financing  High Growth: The Saving-Investment  Challenge.
36.  The previous  section  focused  on the consistency  of fiscal  policy given growth, inflation  and
sustainable  current deficit targets.  The relationship  between fiscal deficit and growth was not
examined  directly. How does fiscal policy  affect  growth? One key link is through  the implications
of fiscal policy for saving and investmenL Maintaining  high growth will require an adequate
investment  effort.  Empirical  evidence  from Pakistan  suggests  that the rate of capital accumulation
is a major determinant  of economic  growth. What  constitutes  an adequate  investment  effort? Over
the past 20 years, Pakistan's average  fixed investment  rate has been around 17% of GDP. which,
given the rate of growth of the economy, yielded a net capital output ratio of 2.75 and a gross
capitl-output ratio of 3.14.  So, assuming  unchanged  efficiency,  a 6% growth trget  will require
a gross fixed investment  effort of about 19% of GDP p.a., which is higher than the past average
rate.  However, this ignores an important  factor:  the need to build up the economic  and social
infrastructare which appears to have been neglected in the past.  Evidence from fast-growing
economies  show that their investment  efforts have been in the range of 24-30% of GDP p.a.
Therefore,  it is reasonable  to expect that Palistan would need to accelerate  its investment  effort to
the 21-22% of GDP range in order to sustain the growth rate of 6% p.a.  This corresponds to a
gross ICOR of about 3.5.
37.  The financig of this investment  effort, however, will present  a major challenge. Table 18
shows  the trend in investment  fiance  broken  down by its components-foreign  and national  saving.
The patter  shows  a fairly strong dependence  on foreign saving-about a quarter of the investment
effort is financed  through  foreign  saving. We saw in the  previous  section  that  the level  of sustainable
current account  deficits  (foreign  saving)  is around  3% of GDP--much  lower than  the 5% of the past.
At the same time, it was noted above  that the fixed  investment  rate will need to be raised from 17%
of GDP to around  21-22%. Adding  the two  yields a total required  increase  in national  saving  effort
of 6-7% of GDP.  This is an indication  of the magnitude  of internal  adjustment  necessary  to ensure
the consistency  of growth  with macroeconomic  stability.
Table 18. Paldstan  - Saving-Investment  Balance, 1972-92
(% of GDP)
Average  Average
____________________  |  1972-80  1980-85  1986  1987  19B8  1989  1990  1991  1992
Invesbflent
- Gross Fixed Ilnvesunent  16.7  16.8  17.0  17.5  16.5  17.3  17.3  17.1  17.2
- Change  m stocks  4.3  1.8  1.8  1.6  15  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.4
- Gross Invesuient  16A  18.6  18.8  19.1  18.0  18.9  18.9  18.7  18.6
Financed by:
- Foreign Saving  5.5  4.0  3.9  2.2  4.4  4.8  4.2  4.8  3.0
- National Saving  10.9  14.6  14.9  16.6  13.6  14.1  14.2  13.9  13.4
Source:  World Tables 1993  and Minislly of Finance- 32 -
J
38.  Expanding the saving effort by this large magnitude is  not an easy task: it is not an
impossible challenge  either.  As shown in Table 6 earlier, there are many countries where the
national  saving effort is in the range of 20% of GDP or above (e.g. India, Indonesia, Thailand,
Malaysia). Efforts will be needed to raise both the private and the public saving rate.  In Pakistan,
special emphasis  needs to be placed on public saving, which brings us to fiscal policy once again.
39..  Avoiding  a Crunch on the Private Sector: The 'crowding  out' effect of fiscal policy  can be
best understood  by looking at another accounting  identity: fiscal deficit is simply  equal to the sum
of foreign saving (current account  deficit)  and net private saving  (difference  between  private saving
and invesunent). So, given  sustainable  current  account  deficits  (foreign  saving), higher  fiscal deficits
must be financed  trough  a private net surplus.  Table 19 illustrates  the 'crowding out' impact  of
Pakistan's large fiscal deficits on the private sector.
40.  Running  negative.public  saving implies that a part of the investible  surplus is being use,d  to
finance public consumption. Private sector saving has been mnobilized  for the public sector part,y
through the inflation tax but mostly through domestic borrowing.  To contain the fiscal cdst of:
domestic  borrowing, Pakistan  has followed a policy of financial  repression  for a fairly long period.
(see Graph 9 for movements  in interest rates).  While  fmnancial  repression allowed the Government
to mobilize  resources for the budget  deficit at below coSt, the oppormnity  cost of this policy was
reduced fnancial resource  mobilization  and repressed4private  credit and investment. For example,
bank deposits  and private  credit as a share  of GDP has been muchlower in Pakistan  than  in countries'
with more liberalized  financial  policies. Both fnancial variables  show signs of relative  decline or
stagnation,  unlike  other high performing  economies  which exhibit  considerable  financial  djnamism
(see Table 20, see also Box 3).  -
41  Financial  liberalization  inevitably  results in.  a rising interest cost of fiscal deficits.  Indeed,
evidence  that  this has been  happening  in Pakistan  was presented  earlier. It was also pointed out that
the dynamics  of borrowing (expression  2) could evetually lead to a major financial  crisis for the
public sector. Rising real interest rate is also of concem to the private sector, as this tends  to have
an adverse effect  onincentive for investment. The challenge  for policy is to develop  an appropri,e
combination  pf macroeconomic  policies  that prevents financial  repression  but also avoids'high real
interest rates.  Fiscal policy has a very imporant role here.  As Paldstan proceeds with fiurther
financial  liberalization  to facilitate  stronger  financial  intermediation  and improved  financial  resource
allocation, this should  be combined with fiscal adjustment  to prevent  a crowding out of the private
sector through  high interest rates, while also preventing  a public sector financing  crisis.- 33 -
Table 19: Pakistan--Private  Sector Pinancing  of Public  Tnvestmen:  A/
(S  of GDP)
m  m_  -
Average  Average  1986  1987  19B8  1989  1990  1991  1992
1972-80  1980-85
Public  Investment  11.2  9.3  9.3  9.7  3.8  9.0  8.3  8.2  7.7
Flinced  By:
- Foreign  Savings  h/  5,0  3.6  1.7  1.9  3.3  4.0  S.  I  3.2  2.1
-Public  Saving  1.3  0.6  -0.4  -1,8  -1.6  -1.4  0.1  -2.2  -0.3
- Private Net Surplus  4.9  5.1  8.0  9.6  7.1  6.4  5.1  7.2  5.9
Private Investment  5.2  9.3  9.5  9.4  9.2  9.9  10.6  10.5  10.9
Private National Saving  9.6  14.0  15.3  18.7  15.2  15.5  14.1  16.1  13.7
Private Foreign Saving  0.5  0.4  2.2  0.3  1.1  0.8  1.1  1.6  0.9
al  Stock changes are assumed to be financed by the private sector.
h/  Defined as public sector's share of current account deficit.
Source:  Ministry  of Finance
Table  20:  Financial  Develonment  in Pakistan  Relative  to Selected  Countrie A/
1972  1980  1985  1990  1992
D  PC  D  PC  |D  PC  D  PC  D  PC
GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP
Pakistn  31.9  27.9  27.5  24.0  281  31.0  24.1  27.5  28.8  26.7
Indonesia  -12.0  .5  18.1  18.2  38.2  50.2  47.6  55.0
Malaysia  39.7  21.1  40.2  38.3  53.9  61.7  57.1  72.2  -
Thailand  25.9  19.5  31.2  30.6  54.3  49.5  78.2  79.3  - -
Chile  19.6  9.7  21A4  43A  27.0  70.1  33.5  50.2  36.8  51.2
a/  D = Total  bank deposits; PC =  private credit; GDP - gross domestic prodi.t.
Source:  International  Fiaial  Sctdstics
42.  Not all public spending  is at the expense  of private spending. Public investment  can and
should  play an important role in supporting  private investment  and economic growth.  There is
adequate  empirical  evidene which  suggests  that  public  spending  in physical  infrastructure  and  human
capital play an important role in raising the productivity  of private investment and increasing
economic  growth.  Baffes and Shah (1993), for example, using cross-country  data, found a strong
positive  response  of GDP growth  to human  capital  and infastructure investment  for a large number
of counties including  Pakistan. As noted in para 34, there is a concern that Pakistan  will need to- 34 -
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invest quite heavily in basic economic and social infrastructure to increase  labor productivity and
reduce  the cost  of production.  So, another major challenge for  fiscal policy  is to ensure  that the
composition of the public  investment program is consistent with Pakistan's  development objectives
and priorities.  We now return to  the role  of public spending  on human resource  development  in
some greater detail in the next section.
Human Capital Formation and Implications for Pakistan's  Growth Performance
43.  One of the key  findings of the East Asian Miracle  stmdy is that the high performing  East
Asian economies invested very heavily in human capital formation.  Quantitative analysis suggest that
human capital was a key factor explaining the better growth performance of these economies.  There
is similar evidence of a very strong role of human capital in explaining growth performance  across- 35 -
Box 3
Costs of Financial  Repression
The-costs  of.financial  repression-can.be  substantal.  Mexico's experience  illustrates
the effects of financial  repression  under.  rising  inflation. Financial  controls intensified  after.
1981 as.inflation  soared, and the ratio of private credit to GDP dropped below already low  -:
levels.  Foliowing  fiiancial liberalintion in 1990, the ratio-  doubled in two years;  In Ghana,;..
private  crditiwas ata. very low level in the. late:  1980s, reflecting years of financial.
repression.  Countries  that abstined from.  repressive  interest rate:-controls,  such as. Chile and..;::
Thailand,.and.Indonesia:(after  ..1983) had very high levels of private credit which may.
partially explain their superior investment  and-  growth performance.  in the 1980s.  ..
Source: Willia  Easterly andm  Klms Schmidt-Hebbel.  (1993)
countries from a number of other studies (see for example Barro (1991); Barro and Lee (1993)).
What are the implications  of this result for Pakistan that has grown fairly rapidly but without
commensurate  progress in improving  its human  capital"?
44.  One obvious  implication  of the relative  neglect  of human  development  has been the high rate
of population  growth in Pakistan. So, even with a growth rate over the past ten years that has been
the highest in the South Asia Region, PakSlant'a  per capita  GDP growth  has been below the region's
average.  Therefore, over the medium-to-long  term, a major pay-off to substantial investnent in
human capital,  especially  female  education,  would  be a sharp reduction  in the population  growth  rate.
45.  The fact that Pakistan has sustained  an average  growth of 6.0% p.a.  over the past twenty
years even with the neglect  of human capital  formation  has emerged as a development  puzzle. One
needs to look a bit more deeply at the sectoral sources of growth to understand this phenomenon
While there is some positive evidence of structural  change happening in.  Pakistan over the past 20
years, especially  in terms of the share of manufacturing  exports  in total exports, the picture does not
suggest the making  of a dynamic  economy. The share of manufactming  in GDP remains relatively
small.  Moreover, there is a strong dependence  of the manufacturing  sector on a small number of
agriculture-related  industies (cotton, foodstff).  Given the relatively  tiin manufacturing  base, it is
not surprising that skldls  have not yet emerged  on a major consraint on the rate of economic  growth.
Moreover, fim  level analysis suggests that on-die-job  traimng  has been playing an miportan role
in skill formation, making up for some of the deficiencies  resulting from weak formal education
In agriculture,  where growth was also fairly robust (4.2% p.a.), a large part of the output expansion
"  See Behnman  and Schneider (1991) for a compartive  analysis of invesmen  in human capital in Pakistan  and odier
developing countries.- 36 -
came from area expansion  supported by heavily subsidized  water and fertilizer.  Except for cotton
and. wheat, productivity improvements  have not been very significant.  In the services sector,
activities that have dominated  include construction, trade and informal sector services.  Given the
limited nature of the skills required, learning-by-doing  seems to have been the main basis for
acquiring the skills needed  to perform these functions.
46.  The real question  boils down to whether the past economic  activities  will continue to provide
the basis for growth in the future?  The hypothesis  of this paper is that this will be very difficult.
Take agriculture, which as noted has grown at the healthy pace of over 4% p.a. over the past two
decades. Continued  strong agricultural  growth rate would  be critical to sustainfing  high overaU  GDP
growth.  As noted, although  there have been some improvements  in productivity,  expansion  of area
under cultivation  supported by heavily subsidized  water and fertilizer has played a critical role in
supporting  past agricultural  growth. 20 Evidence  suggests  that there is a substantial  productivity  gap,
even with available  technology,  between potential  yields per hectare and what is actually achieved
for most major crops including  wheat.  For the futare, much more reliance will need to be put on
productivity  improvements  than in the past to support a healthy agricultural growth rate as land and
water have become increasingly  scarce.  Also, with rising cost of farm production resulting from
cutbacks in subsidies on fertilizer, increases in water O&M charges and reduction of interest
subsidies for mechanized inputs, improvements  in farm productivity  will be essential to maintain
incentives. A further change that  will be necessary  is to diversify farm production  away from heavy
reliance on three major crops-rice, cotton  and wheat-to higher-value  production such as fruits and
vegetbles.  Apart from rising cost of farm inputs, domestic  demand for food crops (rice, wheat) is
likely to expand.  less rapidly with the slowdown  in population  growth rate and given  .the relatively
low income elasticity of these products.  On the other hand, the higher income elasticity of other
farm products-  (fruits, vegetables, meat) is likely to raise their prices.  Improvements in farm
productivity  and diversification  towards higher value crops will require considerable  improvements
in farmer education  and research and extension services.
47.  In manufacturing,  growth has proceeded  at an average  pace of about 7.4% p.a.  The sector
remains heavily dominated  by two main activites: textles and food and beverages. Again, demand
constraints  for textiles  at the interational level will limit ability to expand at the same pace as in the
past.  A more diversified  manufactuing base geared to the world markets will be needed to sustain
continued  rapid growth of the manufactring sector. A more matured  and diversified  industrial  base
will be much more skill intensive than at present  This is fully borne out by the experience of the
fast growing economies of East Asia.  Secondly, the correction of policy distortions currently
underway and/or necessary for the fiuture-especially  trade policy reform--wili reduce the rents
derived from trade and other protection. Greater competitive  pressure at both home and abroad  will
require substantial  improvements  in labor productivity  in the manufacturing  sector. Again, a better
educated and trained labor force wiUl  be necessary  to raise labor productivity.
20  For example,  torl cropped  area expanded  from 16.6 million  hectares  in 1972  to 21.35 million  hecaires  in 1992:  water
availablitw  increased  from  71 MAF in 1972  to 124  MAF in 1992;  fertlizer off-take  grew  from 379  thousand  NIT in
1972  to 2068 thousand  NIT in 1?92.- 37 -
48.  Even  in  the  services sector, skill requirements are  changing.  The  reduction of  the
government's  economic  role in infrastructure  and services and the growing role of the private sector
is associated with greater competition in the provision of quality services at competitive prices.
Again, productivity  improvements  will need to play a key role in supporting  growth rates of 6-7%
p.a., calling  for a more skilled labor force.
49.  It is hard to predict with any degree of certainty  how quickly the structural transformation
in growth will need to take place and therefore when the skills constraint will begin to bite in.
Experience  of other countries unequivocally  suggest that this is a reality that will need to be faced
sooner or later. Therefore, it is in Pakistan's interest  to accelerate  efforts to improve human capital
formation. Fortunately, there is some evidence  that this is now well recognized,  as indicated  by the
formulation of the Social Action Program.  The implementation  tasks ahead, however, remain
formidable.
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
50.  Pakistan's rapid growth rate over the past two decades has attracted considerable  attention
and debate, with some regarding this growth performance  as a "development  puzzle" in view of a
number of disconcerting  factors that has prevailed  along with rapid growth.  These include: high
fiscal and current account  deficits,  a low  saving  and investment  effort, and a neglect  of human  capital
formation.  This paper sought to address two questions: What factors explain Palistan's  rapid
growth?  Can Pakistan sustain high economic growdt over the next 10-20 years without first
addressing  the three disconcertng factors mentioned  above?
51.  What are the determinants of the past growth performance?  Using a standard statistical
framework, the paper concludes  that:
Physical capital accumulation played a  very  important role  in  Pakistan's  growth
performance-overall and in the manufacturing  sector. Although  Pakistan's investment
rate remains low by mternational  standards, the fixed investment  rate grew steadily
during the 1970s and then stabilized  at around 17% of GDP in the mid-1980s.  This
allowed the capital stock,  economy-wide and in the  manufacuarng  sector,  to expand
fairly rapidly which in turn supported a substantial  increase  in the capital labor ratios
and labor productivity.
Accumulation of  labor also played a  signifcant role in overall economic growth,
although  the statistical  significance  of labor in explaining  growth in the manufactring
sector came  out as rather low. The relatively  weaker statistical  significance  of the labor
coefficient,  especially  in the manacturnng growth  equation, reflects  the growing captial
intensity of production.  But it is also an indication  that, colons paribus, population
growth is too fast.  Labor markets cannot absorb such a rapid growth in population,
particularly  with Pakistan's  very low skills level. The increase  in capital  intensity  could
be the efferct  of two forces at work.  First, Pakistan's macroeconomic  policies have
generally  favored greater capital intensity  of production, resulting from under-priced
caphal imports  due to over-valued  exchange  rate (well  upto the mid-1980s), low interest- 38 -
rates and other incentives. Second,  external  migration  of skilled and semi-skilled  labor
in the 1970s and early 1980s  that tended to raise real wages.
Greater trade liberalization,  as measured by the increase in the ratio of total value of
exports and imports to  GDP, had a  strong positive impact on Pakistan's growth
performance.  Once again, however,  the  statistical significance of  trade  policy
surprisingly was reduced in the case of manufacturing  sector.  Nevertheless,  the strong
positive role of greater trade openness suggests that Pakistan needs to continue with
further trade reforms to enhance  competition  and economic efficiency.
The structural change dummy  variable included  to capture the impact of the change in
the policy regime in Pakdstan  from the interventionist  policy regime of the 1972-77
period to the market-oriented  economy  since 1978 came  up with a significant  coefficient
in the case of both aggregate  and manufacturing  sector growth equations- This result
is explained by the major improvement in efficiency resulting from the reduction in
controls and bureaucratic interventions.  Estimates of total factor productivity (TFP)
confirm this finding as well-TIP  change was negative in the first period as compared
with the positive contribution  of TIP change  to growth in the later period.  Once  again,
this reinforces the importance  of further progress with economic  liberalization.
52.  Can past growth rates be sustained  in the medium-to  longer term? The paper examined  each
of the three disconcerting  factors in some depth. A key conclusion is that past growth rates winl  be
difficult to sustain without substantial progress in addressing these concerns.  The analysis of
consistency  of macroeconomic  policies  of the past-especially fiscal policy was examined  on the basis
of a quantitative  framework developed  by Sweder van Wijnbergen (1988) and others.  The key
conclusions  of this analysis are as follows:
The main reason that Pakistan was-  able to sustain high growth and avoid a fiancial
crisis in the face of large fiscal deficits was that the real interest rates on both external
and domestic  debt were substanially negative  during the 1970s. Mainly  because of this
factor, debt to GDP ratios continued to decline even though Pakistan ran substantial
fiscal and current account  deficits in the 1970s.
lHowever, real  intrest  rates have been  uning  positive during  the  1980s.  This
development has already impacted, as expected, quite adversely on Paldstan's debt
situation.  As a result, notwithstanding  some reduction in fiscal and current account
deficits, the interest burden of the domestic and external debt has been increasing
significandy  in the 1980s.
The  outlook  is  that  both foreign  and  domestic real  interest  rates  will  become
significantly  positive in the 1990s. In this situation, if Palcistan  were to ran fiscal and
current account  deficits of the same magnitude  as in the past, a fnancial crisis is likely
to emerge pretty rapidly.
*  It is not possible to avoid a debt crisis by fimding larger fiscal deficits through money
creation.  The analysis shows that Pakistan's inflation target of 5% p.a.  is consistent-39-
with 'inflation tax' of about 2-2.5% of GDP.  This tax will reach a maximum of 3-
3.2% of GDP with an inflation  rate of 20%.  A further acceleration  of inflation  will cut
the 'iMflation  tax base' (real money  balances)  pretty rapidly so that the revenue  proceeds
from inflation  will actually fall.  Even trying to generate the maximum  revenue of 3-
3.2% of GDP from higher inflation tax (20%) is unwise.  The adverse effects of this
higher inflation  on resource allocation  and income distribution  can be quite severe.
Estimates  of sustainable  current account  deficit (e.g. deficits that  do not worsen  external
creditworthiness)  suggest a value of about 3% of GDP p.a.  Consistent  with this and
the inflation  target of 5  %, sustainable  fiscal deficits are in the range of 4.5-5 % of GDP
per annum. It is important  to note that these fiscal deficits are sustanable in the sense
that they are consistent with other macroeconomic  targets/variables (GDP growth,
export growth, real interest rate and inflation). If these targets/variables  change, the
level of sustinable fiscal deficit will also change.  In particular, external shocks could
reduce growth, weaken export performance  and raise real interest rates.  To guard
against these risks, a prudent policy stance would be to aim for an even lower fiscal
deficit than 4.5-5.0% of GDP.
Fiscal  prudence calls for avoiding  any net addition  to domestic  debt, given its high and
growing financial cost.  It  is  therefore important to  ensure  that  revenues from
seignorage (that are consistent with the 5% inflation target) are fully available for
financing the ordinary fiscal deficits.  This will require a rapid phase out of "quasi-
fiscal deficits" resulting from the transactions  between the State Bank of Palistan and
the private sector.
The paper also suggests the need for a balanced  use of fiscal, monetary  and exchange
rate  policies. Patting the  burden of external  adjustment  fully on the real exchange  rate,
as Pakistan seems to have done in  the past, is inconsistent with improvements in
external and internal balance not only because fiscal deficits will continue to put
pressure on the external and internal  debt  but also because  a real exchange  depreciation
will impose  capital  loss on the stock  of external  debt  A balanced  policy stance  involves
setting the real exchange rate at its appropriate level and using monetary and fiscal
policies  to manage  aggregate  demand and stabilize  the real exchange  rate.
53.  Regarding  the implications  of the low saving-investnent  effort, the paper concludes that a
substntial adjustment  will be needed  to raise national  saving and investment  in order to ensure the
consistency  of the growth  target with the need  to reduce macroeconomic  imbalances,  while financing
the acumulation  of physical and human capital required to  support high growth.  The need
particularly  is to raise the national  saving rate from the curent low level of 14% of GDP to around
20-22% of GDP.  This, in turn, will require a substantial  fiscal adjustment  which will raise publc
revenues and reduce public consumption  tO achieve a public saving rate of 3-4% of  GDP, as
compared with negative  savings presendy.  A similar adjustnent in public capital spending will be
needed to ensure that public investment is focused  on areas that promote private sector investment
and growth-e.g. physical and human infras  .-40  -
54.  Lower  fiscal deficits will also help reconcile the  need for  greater  financial resource
mobilization  with the objective of stimulating  private investment.  A large part of the domestic
financing  of the fiscal deficit  has come from borrowing  from the private sector. To contain the fiscal
cost of domestic borrowing, Pakistan  has followed a policy  of financial  repression for a fairly long
period.  While financial  repression  allowed the Govermnent  to mobilize  resources for the budget at
below cost, the opportunity cost of this policy was reduced financial resource mobilization and
repressed private credit and investnent.  For examnple,  bank deposits and private credit as a share
of GDP have been much lower in Pakistan than in countries  with more liberalized  fmancial  policies.
Both indicators  show signs of stagnation  or even  decline  from relatively  low levels, unlike other high
performing economies which exhibit considerable financial dynamism.  Financial liberalization,
however, inevitably  results in an increase  in real interest rates which tends to have an adverse effect
on incentive  for private investment. The challenge  for policy, therefore, is to develop an appropriate
combination  of macroeconomic  policies that prevents financial  repression but also avoids high real
interest rates.  Fiscal policy has a very important role here.  As Pakistan proceeds with financial
liberalization to facilitate  stronger financial intermediation  and improved resource allocation, this
should be combined with fiscal adjustment  to prevent a crowding out of the private sector through
high real interest rates.
55.  Finally, the paper argues that Pakistan's  ability to sustain  high growth rates in the medium-to-
long term will also depend upon rapid  progress with human  capital  formation. In the first place, the
ability to reduce population growth rate will depend critically upon human resource development,
especially education of  women.  Moreover, the sources of  growth in  the  future wiU change
substantially, as compared with the past.  A diversified  manufacturing  sector wiU  need to lead the
way, supported  by improved  agricultural  productivity  and more efficient  services. These in turn will
require a much higher skdll  intensity  of production than in the past.  The international  evidence on
the importance of  human capital formation for sustained growth performance is indisputable.
Paldstan's recent shift in emphasis on this subject, as reflected in the Social Action Program, is
evidence that this reality has dawned upon the policy-makers.  Speedy implementation  of  this
program however, remains a challenge.- 41 -
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Annex
Table Al.  Data for Axzregate Growth Rel!ressions
Real GDP  Real Capital  Labor Force  Trade Policy  Structural
at market  Stock  Dummy  Y
prices
(Rs. billion)  (Rs. billion)  (million)  (%)
1972  235.17  - 18.94  19.74  0
1973  251.92  346.53  19.61  29.55  0  7.12
1974  260.53  369.34  20.12  34.39  0  3.42
1975  271.30  398.62  20.64  32.42  0  4.13
1976  285.60  437.37  21.54  30.83  D  5.27
1977  296.93  477.93  22.48  28.30  0  3.97
1978  320.90  517.01  23.46  27.75  1  8.07
1979  332.70  555.77  24.49  33.44  1  3.68
1980  367.34  601.55  25.07  36.58  1  10.41
1981  396.50  642.12  25.65  35.70  1  7.94
1982  422.30  684.13  26.27  32.16  1  6.51
1983  450.82  731.14  26.91  35.6B  1  6.75
1984  473.93  778.45  27.45  35.1  B  1  5.13
1985  509.82  829.61  28.00  34.00  1  7.57
1986  537.84  885.73  28.05  35.23  1  5.50
1987  572.48  947.79  29.60  35.13  1  6.44
1988  617.10  1008.62  29.93  36.06  1  7.79
1989  646.70  1076.81  30.87  36.35  1  4.80
1990  674.58  1146.49  31.82  39.77  1  4.31
1991  711.76  1218.29  32.81  39.41  1  5.51
1992  771.52  1309.60  33.82  41.50-  1  8.40
Data Sources and Notes:
1)  Dat  on GDP obtabd  from 1993 World Tables,  1987 =  100.  1992 figure estinated by applying growth rate esui-=d
from data obtained from GOP.
2)  Real capial stock data estimated by using real investment data provided by GOP, reported in dte various World Bank
Economic Repot,  and applying the perpetual inventory method.
3)  Labor Force Data provided by GOP, as reported in die various World Bank Economic Reports.
4)  Trade Policy Variable constructed as the ratio of exports plus impors and divided by GDP.  Data obtained from World
Tables 1993.-45-
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Table A2:  Data for Manufacmring  Sector  Growth Regression
Real Value  Real Capital  Labor Forcc  ___
Added  Stock  in  MY  ML  MK  |
Manufactaring  Manufacturing  Manufacturing
(Rs. billion)  (Rs. billion)  (000)  (%)  (%)  (%)
1972  29.83  2.40 
1973  33.02  44.1  2.54  10.69  5.83
1974  35.48  47.2  2.66  7.45  4.72  6.92
1975  35.68  52.1  2.80  0.56  5.26  10.49
1976  36.24  61.7  2.95  1.55  5.36  18.33
1977  39.00  73.7  3.11  1.91  5.42  19.43
1978  43.10  86.8  3.28  10.51  5.47  17.90
1979  46.67  99.6  3.46  8.28  5.49  14.73
1980  51.58  112.3  3.47  10.52  0.29  12.75
1981  52.29  122.2  3.48  11.54  0.29  8.80
1982  59.48  130.3  3.49  13.75  0.29  6.63
1983  63.66  139.0  3.50  7.03  0.29  6.65
1984  68.6B  148.1  3.61  7.88  3.14  6.58
1985  74.24  155.7  3.73  8.09  3.32  5.12
1986  79.84  165.6  3.62  7.54  -2.95  6.33
1987  85.85  174.1  4.08  7.53  12.71  5.12
1988  94.42  183.3  3.72  9.98  - 8.82  5.29
1989  98.16  195.9  3.84  3.96  3.22  6.88
1990  107.23  211.2  3.96  9.24  3.13  7.81
1991  113.88  227.5  4.08  6.20  3.03  7.74
1992  122.65  244.75  4.21  7.70  . 3.18  7.56
Data Sources and Notes:  Same as explained in Table Al.-46-
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Table A3:  Pakistan - Analysis of Domestic Debt.  1972-1992
Total  Held  by  Adjusted  External  Total  Adjusled
Domestic  SBP  Domestic  Debt  Adjusted  Dzbt/
Debt  Debt  Debt  GDP
1972  16.67  8.60  8.07  34.14  39.21  72.5
1973  17.8Z  8.81  9.01  44.04  53.05  79.3
1974  17.43  7.88  9.55  48.96  58.51  67.4
1975  21.25  9.27  11.98  54.97  66.95  59.6
1976  27.42  12.05  15.37  65.05  80.42  60.9
1977  32.70  15.53  17.17  75.05  92.22  61.6
1978  38.53  16.11  22.42  82.60  105.02  59.5
1979  49.37  24.34  25.03  88.43  113.46  58.2
1980  56.75  25.23  31.52  98.36  129.88  55.2
1981  60.09  25.76  34.35  104.15  138.50  49.8
1982  76.66  34.76  41.90  137.82  179.72  55.4
1983  87.86  27.13  60.73  156.85  217.58  59.7
1984  106.55  35.60  70.95  171.05  242.00  57.6
1985  143.93  54.71  89.22  212.72  301.94  63.9
1986  203.12  59.83  143.29  247.91  391.20  76.0
1987  248.45  55.69  192.76  290.42  483.18  84.4
1988  290.10  81.96  208.14  305.31  513.45  76.0
1989  333.21  90.04  243.07  375.88  618.95  80.4
1990  381.31  110.77  270.54  448.14  718.68  83.9
1991  448.11  132.84  315.32  546.68  862.20  84.3
1992  521.72  158.18  363.54  605A.I  968.95  80.6
Data Sources and Notes:
1)  Total Domestic  Debt data from Ministry of Finance (Economic  Survey)
2)  Data on debt held by Statc Bank of Pakistan (SBP) obtained from International  Finance Statistics  (]FS) and SBP Monthly
Buletin.
3)  &xtcrual  Debt data from World Bank Debt Tables
4)  GDP from World Tables, 1993-.47-
Annex
Table A4:  Data for Retiression  Analysis  of Determinant
of Current Account De=icit
Current  Fiscal  Terms  Real  Foreign
Account  Balance  of  lExchange  Real
as % of  as % or  Trade  Rate  Interes
GDP  GDP  Races
1972  -3.1  - 5.9  122.20  12.80  -7.05
1973  - 2.0  - 8.2  162.50  15.39  -13.90
1974  -6.2  -8.7  125.70  15.12  -20.12
1975  -10.4  -12.9  102.10  13.56  -9.34
1976  -7.1  -12.8  104.70  12.10  0.65
1977  -7.0  -10.9  109.70  11.99  - 7.96
1978  - 3.4  -9.9  113.90  12.40  -12.89
1979  - 5.7  -11.6  104.80  13.42  -10.82
1980  -4.8  -10.4  101.60  13.99  - 6.04
1981  - 3.6  - 8.5  99.60  12.24  2.63
1982  - 5.0  - 8.7  95A0  12.91  5.12
1983  - 1.8  -11.1  98.30  13.15  6.36
1984  -3.2  - 9.9  92.70  12.52  6.28
1985  -5.4  - 8.7  89.70  13.53  2.92
1986  -3.9  -8.1  96.80  15.58  -14.0
1987  -2.2  -8.2  100.00  17.90  - 6.15
1988  -4.4  -8.5  91.20  17.59  -3.43
1989  -4.8  -7.7  83.90  18.52  4.70
1990  -4.7  -6.5  80.00  20.04  - 1.7D
1991  - 4.3  -8.7  80.00  19.22  2.04
1992  - 3.1  - 7.5  75.00  19.21  1.37
DataSoumes  an  otes:
1) Current  account  and fiscal  balance  data  from  various  IMF  and World  Bank  economic  reports. Fiscal  balance  defined  as
total  public  sector  borrowing  requirement.
2) Real  exchange  rate  defined  as Rs./$  and  deflated  by the  ratio  of domestic  CPI  to US  CPL Data  obtained  from
Ineational Financial  Staistics,  IMF.
3) Foreign  real  ihnerest  rate  is defined  as one  year  libor  adjusted  for world  inflation  (MUV  index).Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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